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1  Introduction 
Approximately 25% of all carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) emissions, or anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, come from the transport sector, which relies on petroleum to 
supply the majority of its energy needs. According to the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), transport’s GHG emissions have increased at a faster rate than any other energy using 
sector and emissions are expected to continue to grow at a rate of about 2% per year if the 
current energy usage patterns persist. Biofuels have been promoted as one possible and 
promising way of reducing GHG emissions from the transport sector and are the primary option 
for cutting transport fossil fuel energy use and emissions until electric and/or hydrogen fuel cell 
powered vehicles and supporting infrastructure can be deployed. Moreover, the technology is 
available today without reducing consumer utility of cars as opposed to hydrogen and battery 
driven cars. Growth of global biofuel production, a result of ambitious government support 
programs, and developments in the production of 2nd generation biofuels made from cellulosic 
biomass, has encouraged several governments to continue to rely on biofuels as a renewable 
source of energy for the transport sector. This is in spite of the polarity surrounding the 
characteristics of 1st generation biofuels stemming from mounting criticism of their high 
lifecycle GHG emissions and proposed contribution to rising food prices. 
The promotion of renewable energy sources and ‘demand reducing policies’ intended to lower 
consumption of fossil fuels in order to mitigate emissions has recently met criticism from 
economists. A body of economic theory has recently developed showing that policies designed 
to reduce the use of carbon emitting and exhaustible fossil fuel resources, such as oil, may 
actually lead to an increase in their use and therefore speed up global warming. Hence the term 
‘green paradox.’ This occurs when the suppliers of the exhaustible resources react to the 
policies by increasing current supply in anticipation of reduced future demand. Increasing 
supply is equivalent to increasing emissions. If climate considerations are the driving force 
behind policies designed to support the continued growth of the biofuel industry, policymakers 
should take heed and proceed with caution in order to avoid unintended consequences.  
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While the effects of taxes on fossil fuels and subsidies to cleaner energy substitutes has been 
studied by Gerlagh (2010), Grafton et al. (2010), Hoel (2008, 2010), Sinn (2009) and Withagen 
and van der Ploegh (2010), among others, most analyses are highly theoretical. Furthermore, to 
my knowledge, no one has attempted to analyze the possible supply side response to two of 
the dominant strategies adopted to promote the use of biofuels. This paper attempts to 
address whether or not the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) or blending mandate requirements 
implemented by the U.S. and EU, respectively, which call for increasing use of biofuels in the 
transport sector throughout the next decade, will induce oil resource owners to increase 
current extraction and supply of the resource and therefore increase current emissions. 
Further, GHG accumulation and resulting temperature effects are calculated to evaluate 
whether the policy actions actually speed up global warming. The problem is addressed using a 
simplified model of the global transport market for energy, provided solely by fossil-based fuels 
made from oil and biofuels. A climate change model translates emissions from the use of the 
fossil-based fuels to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere and temperature 
implications. Both models are built in Microsoft Excel and the Solver tool is used to calculate 
the optimal resource price and extraction paths for the different scenarios. 
In an attempt to move from the abstract to the concrete, I created a model that simulates the 
global demand for transport energy through the year 2250. Reference cases are created for two 
market structures, one where transport oil is supplied by a competitive group of oil resource 
owners and one in which the oil resource is supplied by a monopolist. These reference 
scenarios are then modified by the introduction of either a RFS or blending mandate policy, on 
a global scale, that introduces biofuels into the market to evaluate how the oil resource owners 
may adjust their extraction/supply. Alterations to the oil extraction paths are synonymous with 
changes in the transport sector’s carbon emissions generated by the use of the oil. These 
emissions are inputted into a climate change model that determines how emissions translate 
into the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere which affects estimated increases in the 
global temperature. 
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The findings suggest that, with the exception of the introduction of a renewable fuel standard 
policy in a market where oil is supplied competitively, resource extraction rates and emissions 
are delayed compared to reference scenarios in the absence of biofuel policies and the green 
paradox does not hold. For all policy scenarios evaluated, the modified resource extraction and 
emissions paths have negligible impacts on the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. The results imply that the use of biofuels in the transport sector as a substitute for 
oil will play a trivial role in mitigating future increases in global temperatures and that the 
employment of renewable fuel standards and blending mandates will not speed up the rate of 
global warming. While the results offer interesting insight as to how oil resource owners may 
react to RFS and blending mandate type policies, it is important to acknowledge that the 
outcomes hinge heavily on the design of the models used to calculate these reactions.  
The next chapter is intended to provide a background on biofuels, with a focus on 2nd 
generation. Chapter 3 presents the theory of exhaustible resources and Chapter 4 presents the 
concept of the green paradox. The reference model assumptions and results are explained in 
chapter 5 and the biofuel policies and their potential impact on the market for transport fuels 
are addressed in chapter 6. Chapter 7 summarizes the results and conclusions. All currency ($) 
is presented in U.S. dollars. 
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2 Biofuels 
Biofuels are the renewable fuel considered as the substitute energy source for oil in the 
transport sector. In order to frame the context within which the research question is addressed, 
this chapter briefly surveys the current status of the biofuel industry and the political climate 
surrounding their use. A particular emphasis is placed on 2nd generation biofuels, since they are 
expected to play a large role in meeting future biofuel targets.  
2.1 Overview 
Biofuels, including ethanol and biodiesel fossil fuel substitutes made from biomass, have been 
in use since the earliest internal combustion engines. In fact, one of the first prototypes of the 
diesel engine was designed to run on vegetable oil, and several of Henry Ford’s early cars ran 
on bioethanol. The interest in biofuels was renewed as a result of the 1970s oil shocks and is 
flourishing today with government support motivated by several factors including energy 
security, climate change concerns and rural development. Moreover, it is common to 
distinguish between 1st and 2nd generation biofuels. While 1st generation biofuels are made 
from feedstock also suitable for use in human food production, e.g., corn and sugarcane, 2nd 
generation biofuels are made from cellulosic material not useable as a food source. These 
feedstocks include agriculture and forest residues (e.g., bagasse and wood residues), wastes 
(e.g., organic municipal solid waste) and energy crops (vegetative grasses and short rotation 
forest crops such as switch grass and poplar trees). According to IPCC (2007), biofuels have the 
potential to replace a substantial part of petroleum used in the transport sector if technologies 
using cellulosic biomass succeed.  
There is a global consensus that severe consequences will occur if global concentrations of CO2e 
exceed 450-550 parts per million (ppm) by 2050 (IPCC, 2007). Limiting atmospheric 
concentrations to these levels will give us a 50% chance of limiting the increase in average 
global temperature to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. An increase above this level increases the 
probability of severe consequences for almost half of the world’s population through increased 
cases of hunger, malaria, flooding and water shortages (IPCC, 2007). The World Energy Outlook 
2009 450 Scenario, which models future energy demand given a long-term CO2 atmospheric 
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concentration of 450 ppm, projects biofuels to provide 9% (11.7 EJ) of the total transport fuel 
demand (126 EJ) in 2030 (IEA, 2010a). In the Blue Map Scenario of Energy Technology 
Perspectives 2008, which also models future energy demand under the same 450 ppm target, 
biofuels provide 26% (29 EJ) of total transportation fuel (112 EJ) in 2050, with 2nd generation 
biofuels accounting for roughly 90% of all biofuel (IEA, 2008b). More than half of the 2nd 
generation biofuel production in the Blue Map Scenario is projected to occur in non-OECD 
countries, with China and India accounting for 19% of the total production (IEA, 2010b). Clearly, 
2nd generation biofuels are expected to play a significant role in fulfilling transport energy needs 
in order to prevent dangerous levels of climate change. 
Despite significant cost improvements over the past several decades, with the exception of 
Brazil’s sugarcane-based ethanol, 1st generation biofuels are not price competitive with fossil 
fuels without significant government support. Opportunities for additional production cost 
reductions are severely limited. Furthermore, feedstock commodity price increases and energy 
costs have both contributed to higher production costs of 1st generation biofuels from 2004 to 
2007 (IEA, 2008a). Even with recent high petroleum prices and no carbon taxation, most U.S. 
and EU producers would not be able to operate without government subsidies (Eggert and 
Greaker, 2009). On the other hand, cellulosic biofuels are made from far from ripe 
technologies, particularly those made using a biochemical process (see Eggert et al. (2011) or 
IEA (2008a) for further discussion of conversion technologies), and current production costs are 
too high to make them competitive with 1st generation biofuels. However, proposed 
technological advances and more favorable characteristics compared to the 1st generation 
biofuels have placed a huge reliance on this next generation to fulfill renewable fuel goals 
within the transport energy sector.  
Production costs for 2nd generation cellulosic biofuels are currently not competitive with 1st 
generation biofuels or gasoline. Advances to date have brought down the cost from $1.61-
2.00/liters of gasoline equivalent (lge1) in the 1980s to a level where they can compete with 
ethanol from corn today, and future developments can potentially bring down costs all the way 
                                                          
1
 A liter of ethanol contains 0.66 liters of gasoline equivalent. A liter of biodiesel contains 0.89 liters of diesel 
equivalent. 
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to  $0.24/lge (Wyman, 2008). Current costs are hard to confirm due to the proprietary nature of 
the data and the array of feedstock and conversion technologies available. This is evident in the 
wide range of current cost estimates presented in the literature of $0.80-1.97/lge. Different 
assumptions about the timing of cost reductions and feedstock cost predictions explain the 
variance in future cost estimates which range from $0.24-0.60/lge. The cost reductions will be 
driven by a combination of research and development breakthroughs, technology learning and 
economies of scale. In comparison, if crude oil prices are at $100/barrel (bbl), gasoline 
production costs are $0.63/liter plus refining costs.2  
In addition to economic considerations, competition for land and food as well as lifecycle GHG 
assessments have drawn much criticism towards 1st generation biofuels and a desire to fulfill 
targets for the use of the renewable fuel with 2nd generation biofuels. Cellulosic biomass used 
in the production of 2nd generation biofuels refers to plant biomass composed of cellulose, 
hemicelluloses and lignin. Cellulosic materials are abundant, estimated to make up roughly 60-
90% of terrestrial biomass by weight (Pew Center, 2009). In addition to not competing with 
food resources to the extent of 1st generation feedstocks, cellulosic biomass feedstock may, to 
a much larger extent, be produced on marginal land or even be recovered from organic waste 
and similar residuals. This reduces the problem of threatening food security and destroying 
habitats when expanding land use to grow 2nd generation feedstocks. Furthermore, 2nd 
generation biofuels are thought to improve land-use efficiency (Larson, 2008) which refers to 
the level of transportation service that can be provided from a hectare of land. 2nd generation 
biofuels can provide an improvement of approximately 50% in land-use efficiency over sugar-
based 1st generation biofuels and an improvement of up to 2.5 times over starch-based 
biofuels.  
Expert assessments of the global potential for bioenergy production could reach 33-1,500 EJ in 
2050 (IEA, 2010b), the equivalent of roughly 5-245 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe). The 
higher-end of the range is based on a scenario with highly advanced and intensive agriculture 
that would allow for a large share of current agricultural land, roughly 72%, to be available for 
                                                          
2
 Detailed data about refining costs is not available, but may be anywhere from $0.05-$0.20+/liter. 
http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/gasoline/margins/index.html 
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biomass cultivation. Bioenergy covers various sources of biomass, including forestry and 
agricultural residues, waste and dedicated energy crops, i.e., 2nd generation (cellulosic) biofuel 
feedstocks. These factors are important in determining the theoretical capacity of biofuels to 
fulfill transport energy needs and are particularly crucial to support assumptions used to 
determine the supply of biofuels in the policy analyses which follow.  
With regards to GHG emissions, recent contributions have directly questioned whether 1st 
generation biofuels actually lead to any short-run CO2 reductions. Sources of emissions include 
the use of fertilizer when growing the 1st generation biofuel crops, the use of fossil energy in 
the harvesting and processing of the biofuels and land use change, including deforestation, 
among others. Land use change can lead to GHG emissions if the area of arable land is 
increased to accommodate growth of crop inputs for the production of biofuels. 
Table 2.1: GHG reduction by biofuel type including indirect effects 
Biofuel type 30 year, 0% discount rate 
Corn ethanol (best case) -26% 
Corn ethanol (worst case) +34% 
Soy-based biodiesel +4% 
Sugarcane ethanol -26% 
Switchgrass ethanol (cellulosic) -124% 
 
Table 2.1 summarizes the GHG-reducing effect of different biofuels based on lifecycle analyses. 
As shown, cellulosic ethanol is by far the most promising biofuel to reduce emissions (EPA, 
2009). Other studies have placed cellulosic biofuel emissions at 60-120% less than traditional 
fossil-based fuels, with the high end occurring if by-products of the biofuel conversion process 
are used for heating and electricity. In order to evaluate the climate impacts of certain biofuel 
policies, we assume that the net GHG contribution of biofuels is zero. This may be an aggressive 
assumption for earlier periods analyzed, but not so far from reality given that future growth in 
biofuel consumption is expected to come primarily from the 2nd generation or cellulosic-based 
biofuels. 
Even though conversion technologies for the production of 2nd generation biofuels are thought 
to be promising, there is still great uncertainty as to whether production costs will come down 
and whether the availability of raw materials will be adequate for large-scale production to 
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fulfill the transports sector’s energy demands. Thus, policies, preferably in the form of R&D 
investment and learning subsidies for cellulosic biofuels, should aim to uncover the 
technology’s true potential and not operate with ambitious goals for the technology’s future 
market penetration. Nevertheless, significant players in the biofuel market, the U.S. and EU in 
particular, have adopted policies that promote just that in the form of renewable fuel standards 
and blending mandates which guarantee a market for biofuels. These are used in combination 
with substantial direct subsidies to biofuel producers in the form of tax credits and discussed in 
more detail below.   
2.2 Policies 
The U.S. and EU have employed different strategies to support the research and development 
of a 2nd generation biofuels industry and expand the use of the more mature 1st generation 
biofuel market for use in the transport sector. The U.S. provides a wide array of producer 
incentives through substantial tax credits and explicit consumption mandates via the National 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) which sets targeted levels of biofuel consumption. These are 
broken down by biofuel type according to the feedstock input used to produce the renewable 
fuel. The latest RFS requires the use of 136 billion liters of biofuels in 2022, which represents 
7% of the nation’s expected annual gas and diesel consumption in 2022 (EPA, 2010). Tax credits 
are $0.45/gallon ($0.12/liter) and $1.01/gallon ($0.27/liter) for cellulosic biofuels. There is also 
a small producer credit of $0.10/gallon for small scale manufacturing. GHG reduction 
requirements are also being adopted. 
As part of the EU’s 2020 Climate and Energy Package, adopted in 2009, a Renewables Directive 
contains a 10% binding target for the use of biofuels in the transport sector by 2020. This 
means that biofuels must be used to meet 10% of the transport sector’s total energy needs as 
opposed to the U.S. RFS which sets a fixed amount of biofuels that must be used. It also 
introduces a comprehensive set of sustainability criteria that biofuels must fulfill in order to be 
counted towards the target. The Renewables Directive highlights the necessity to “ensure the 
commercial availability of second generation biofuels.” In order to implement the 10% by 2020 
binding target, the European Commission created beneficial conditions for 2nd generation 
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biofuels by requiring that Member States give double weighting in their national biofuel 
obligations to biofuels originating from cellulosic feedstock sources. Excise tax exemptions for 
biofuels produced or blended in European countries have been introduced at various levels up 
to 100% by most Member States although, with the exception of Germany, they don’t 
distinguish between 1st and 2nd generation biofuels.  
The policies adopted by the U.S. and EU discussed above and additional support measures are 
summarized in the table below. A more in-depth discussion of policies employed can be found 
in Eggert, et al. (2011) and IEA (2010b). 
Table 2.2: Summary of policy measures in place for biofuels 
 Consumption 
standards 
Tax credits Tariffs R&D 
support 
GHG 
standards 
U.S.
1
 RFS, levels inc. 
annually 
$0.45/g (1
st
 gen.) 
$1.01/g (2
nd
 gen.) 
$0.54/g+2.5% 
appx. 30% 
total 
Yes Planned 
      
EU
2
 Blending 
requirements, 
10% (2020) 
Yes Yes Yes Planned 
1. The U.S. is the only country with separate mandates and tax credits for cellulosic biofuels.  
2. Level of tax credits/exemptions vary by country. 
 
The ensuing analysis will examine how the U.S.’s RFS and the EU’s blending mandate may affect 
how oil resource owners’ manage their stock and what their reactions might mean for global 
warming over the next several decades. First, we will look at the existing economic theory 
regarding the optimal use of these non-renewable resources.  
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3 Theory of exhaustible resources 
The theory of the optimal use of non-renewable resources has been well developed with 
seminal ideas contributed by Hotelling (1931). Several subsequent applications have since been 
developed and findings contributed, particularly in the ‘70s. Since the reference models are 
derived from perfect competition and monopoly market structures with fixed marginal 
extraction costs, only the results of the theory that relates to these two particular scenarios will 
be addressed.  
3.1 Perfect competition 
The firm’s problem, when facing decisions about how to optimally extract a non-renewable 
resource, is to maximize their net present value of profits obtained from the extraction of the 
resource while taking the market price as given. This comes from the assumption that each of 
the firms are too small to influence the market. Optimal control theory can be used to examine 
the intertemporal allocation of a known, finite stock of non-renewable resource and arrive at a 
set of dynamic and static efficiency conditions used to derive Hotelling’s Principle. 
With    as the price and   as the constant marginal extraction cost, the firm maximizes the 
objective function              
     
 
 
 with respect to     the rate of resource extraction, 
subject to the following constraints:          
 
 
,         and          represents the 
total available stock of resource at     and     
  
  
, i.e., the change in stock over time which 
is equal to the resource extraction. The dotted variable form is used to represent time 
derivatives throughout the paper. The first constraint ensures cumulative extraction is not 
greater than the initial resource endowment.  
The current value Hamiltonian,                    , yields the following first order 
conditions: 
   
  
                (1) 
         
   
  
 (2) 
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From (1), we can see that the price less the extraction cost per unit, i.e., the resource rent, is 
equal to the current value shadow price on the stock of the resource,   . From (2), since the 
stock does not enter into the current value Hamiltonian equation, we know that this resource 
rent should grow over time at the rate of interest, resulting in the following Hotelling Principle 
for the optimal price path for a competitive firm with constant marginal extraction costs:  
  
   
   (3) 
This can also be thought of as the no-arbitrage principle, which may be more intuitive. It implies 
that at any given point in time, the resource owner should be indifferent between extracting an 
additional unit of the resource and investing the proceeds in the market to earn the rate of 
interest, i.e., the opportunity cost of not extracting, or leaving that unit of resource in the 
ground and extracting the following period at a price that has grown by the rate of interest. 
Once the price path is established, one can use the resource constraint to derive the terminal 
extraction period and initial price. The competitive firm will take the price path as given and use 
it to determine their optimal level of extraction/supply per period. 
3.2 Monopoly 
A monopolist has market power and the ability to set prices. They maximize the net present 
value of profits by choosing an optimal extraction and price path, taking into consideration that 
the market price is a function of the level of resource they choose to extract, i.e.,       . The 
problem is to maximize                  
     
 
 
 with respect to   , subject to the same 
constraints listed in the competitive firm’s problem while.   
The current value Hamiltonian                         yields the following first order 
conditions: 
   
  
 
   
   
              (4) 
         
   
  
 (5) 
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From (4) we can see that net marginal revenue is equal to the current value shadow price on 
the stock of the resource. Again, from (5), since the stock does not enter into the current value 
Hamiltonian, we know that this net marginal revenue should grow over time at the rate of 
interest. Let  denote marginal revenue. Then Hotelling’s Principle for a monopoly exhaustible 
resource owner with constant marginal extraction costs can be expressed as 
  
   
   (6) 
If this result is not satisfied, then some marginal reallocation of the resource extraction 
between time periods with different present value of net marginal revenues would increase the 
present value of profits. 
Marginal revenue, or 
   
   
      in (4), can also be written as a function of the price elasticity 
        
 
     
 . 
Let      
 
     
 and ignore extraction costs. By differentiating        we obtain 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
which can also be expressed, using (6) and disregarding extraction costs, as 
  
 
   
  
 
 (7) 
Equation (7) can be used to evaluate how the role of elasticity of demand influences the 
monopoly’s extraction path. A monopolist facing a constant elasticity of demand function, so 
that      and price is proportional to net marginal revenue, will follow a price path that grows 
at the rate of interest exactly as the perfectly competitive firm. Therefore, a monopoly resource 
owner facing a constant elasticity of demand will follow an optimal extraction path. In order to 
evaluate the impact of a variable elasticity of demand, we must know how the elasticity 
changes as the resource extraction changes over time. Taking the time derivative of    gives us 
    
  
     
  
  
. 3 
                                                          
3
 Using       
 
     
,    
  
  
   and 
  
  
  
 
     
  
  
. 
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We know that      since marginal revenue decreases with output and the only way for 
marginal revenue to rise at the rate of interest while the resource is being extracted is for the 
quantity supplied to decline over time. Therefore, the sign of    can be determined directly from 
the sign of 
  
  
 leaving us with the following results using (7): 
(i) If  
  
  
  , then      and 
  
 
     
(ii) If  
  
  
  , then      and 
  
 
   
In case (i), demand elasticity is increasing as demand trends towards saturation and this results 
in a higher price and smaller production initially compared to the competitive market. The 
monopolist is able to take advantage of the more inelastic demand in the earlier periods and 
charge higher prices. This is why the monopolist resource owner is commonly referred to as the 
‘conservationist’s best friend.’ The models used in this paper use a linear function of demand 
for transport fuels which inherently has the absolute value of elasticity increasing as the price 
increases and extraction falls, leading to the results concluded in (i). One can expect to see an 
increasing elasticity of demand as a result of the discovery and availability of good substitutes 
for the given resource, which increases as prices rise.  
The previously derived results are confirmed and expanded upon by Stiglitz (1976) who shows 
that with positive extraction costs and a constant elasticity of demand the monopolist can still 
gain by reducing output in earlier periods relative to what is socially optimal. 
3.3 Cartel-fringe 
As Hotelling (1931), among others, have noted, the industrial organization of the world oil 
market is more appropriately viewed as somewhere in between perfect competition and pure 
monopoly. Salant (1976) modifies the conventional theory of exhaustible resources to account 
for a more accurate picture of the actual market structure: a dominant cartel (OPEC) with a 
competitive fringe (non-OPEC oil producers). He shows that in order for an equilibrium to exist 
in a dominant extractor model, the market will operate in two distinct phases. During the first 
phase, both the cartel and fringe operate and net price and net marginal revenue grow in the 
same proportion at the rate of interest according to Hotelling’s Principle. This implies that the 
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elasticity of demand faced by the cartel is constant throughout this initial phase. At the end of 
the first phase, the competitive fringe exhausts its stock of resource. During the second phase, 
the cartel’s net marginal revenue grows at the rate of interest and price grows at a smaller rate 
until its supply is exhausted, when the price path reaches the choke point. In this combined 
market structure, the initial price lies below the high monopoly price and above the low 
competitive price and the fixed world stock is exhausted more rapidly than under the 
monopoly, but less quickly than under competition. Figure 3.1 illustrates the characteristics of 
the optimal gross price paths for the different market structures, with the solid black line 
representing the cartel-fringe. 
Figure 3.1: Comparison of price paths under different market structures 
 
 
This paper evaluates the OPEC cartel as a monopoly resource owner. An analysis of the cartel-
fringe market is not undertaken. Nevertheless, if the forthcoming analysis concludes that the 
various biofuel policies affect the perfectly competitive and monopoly markets in the same 
way, we can reasonably conclude that the results would hold in a combined market structure. 
However, if the markets react differently, the results are inconclusive and the cartel-fringe 
structure would be an interesting extension to this paper. 
3.4 Empirical relevance 
For the most part, empirical attempts to evaluate the validity of Hotelling’s Principles fail to 
support the theory. One exception is Miller and Upton (1985) who test the theory using a 
P0,C
P0,M
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Price
TimeCompetitive Monopoly
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Hotelling Valuation Principle. The authors first point out that in a world in which the time path 
of exhaustible resources follows Hotelling’s Principle; the value of the reserves in any currently 
operating, optimally managed stock depends mainly on current period prices and extraction 
costs, regardless of when the reserves are extracted. This is the essence of the Hotelling 
Valuation Principle – the average reserve value is equal to the current net price (market price 
less marginal extraction costs) and so it is independent of future prices and extraction costs. 
Letting    represent the value of the reserves/stock,             
 
 
         . This is 
because the growth in the price of the resource will be equally offset by discounting the value 
obtained in the future. The authors found that the estimated Hotelling values can account for a 
substantial portion of the variation in the market values of firms, that the results are robust and 
that the Hotelling measures are better indicators of the stock market value of petroleum 
properties than two widely cited publicly available measures of the value of reserves.4  
However, a subsequent test produced different results for the authors and it, along with other 
studies conducted in the early ‘90s, suggest that the per unit valuation of reserves for oil and 
natural gas is only about half of current net prices (Krautkraemer, 1998). A survey of the 
empirical literature testing the relevance of the basic Hotelling model by Krautkraemer (1998) 
led him to conclude that it does not adequately explain observed resource prices and stock 
values. He notes that other features such as exploration for and discovery of new deposits, 
technological change and capital investment factors overshadow the finite availability of the 
resources as determinants of the observed prices and in situ values. Nevertheless, the models 
used to evaluate the research question are based on the Hotelling Principles derived in this 
chapter since it is the most suitable framework available. 
3.5 Summary 
Table 3.1 summarizes the results for the optimal use of non-renewable resources discussed in 
this chapter. In general, assuming a linear demand for transport fuels, one would expect that a 
monopoly resource owner would set a higher initial price, have a flatter extraction path and 
                                                          
4
 The valuation indicators the results were compared to are the SEC Valuations and the Herold Appraisals. See 
Miler and Upton (1985) for more details. 
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later resource exhaustion date relative to a perfectly competitive firm. These results are 
revisited when the reference models are established. 
Table 3.1: Hotelling’s rules and the impact of the elasticity of demand 
 Perfect competition Monopoly 
Hotelling’s rule  
(constant extraction costs) 
  
   
   
  
   
   
Hotelling’s rule 
(zero extraction costs) 
  
 
   
  
 
   
  
  
    
  
 
   
  
  
    
  
 
   
  
  
    
  
 
   
 
We can now turn to the discussion of how policies designed to influence the market in which a 
nonrenewable resource owner operates may affect their resource extraction paths given the 
optimal conditions derived and discussed above. Of particular interest is how policies adopted 
to promote the use of ‘greener’ substitutes for ‘dirty’ fossil-based fuels in the transport sector 
may influence how an oil producer may opt to manage their stock of the resource. 
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4 Green paradox 
Until recently, the supply-side dynamics of policies designed to promote the use of alternative 
fuels and their impacts on the extraction of fossil-based fuels have largely been ignored. The 
presumption has been that increasing the supply of a readily-available substitute would lower 
the demand and hence price of fossil fuels, thereby lowering the incentive to extract. However, 
this presumption assumes that oil resource owners don’t react to these effects, i.e., that they 
are passive players in the energy market. However, if oil resource owners optimally extract 
their reserves, these owners will react to policies that affect the demand for their reserves and 
therefore adjust their output paths. 
Sinn (2008) identifies the possibility that adverse supply side effects may arise if fossil-based 
fuel suppliers are threatened by reduced future prices brought on by a gradual greening of 
economic policies. Demand-reducing measures exert two countervailing effects on the current 
extraction path: (i) they reduce the incentive to extract today by depressing current prices and 
(ii) they increase the incentive to extract today because the anticipated demand and price 
decline that these policies generate in the future reduces the opportunity cost of the resource 
in situ.  
Sinn (2008) notes that there are numerous ways in which governments and the public are 
implementing strategies to mitigate climate change, but they focus largely on reducing demand 
for fossil fuels through the development of alternative energy technologies and higher taxes on 
fossil fuels. Meanwhile the public debate is silent about the supply side. This is problematic 
since the development of the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere depends on the extraction 
and use of the fossil-based fuel, a result of both demand and supply. Therefore, demand 
reducing measures will only be effective in mitigating climate change to the extent that they 
induce fossil-based fuel resource owners to leave their stock of fossil fuels underground or slow 
down the rate of extraction. Current levels of extraction must be reduced enough to allow the 
earth to maintain its natural capacity to absorb atmospheric CO2, an ability that is becoming 
less effective as the atmospheric stock of GHGs continues to grow. The policies needed to 
mitigate climate change are those that make the fossil fuel extraction path flatter, meaning that 
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resource owners extract less today and more in the distant future. Demand reducing measures 
ability to induce this behavior is ambiguous. 
Further, Sinn (2008) observes that if the suppliers of fossil-based fuels follow their extraction 
plans regardless of the decline in price, demand reductions by one country or a group of 
countries, such as those ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, will be useless.  The reduced price will 
motivate other countries to increase their energy demand by exactly the same amount. This 
phenomenon is referred to as carbon leakage and can also occur if a country decides to leave 
some polluting sectors unregulated. Since energy created from the burning of fossil fuels 
cannot be decoupled from injecting more carbon into the atmosphere, with the exception of 
sequestration and afforestation, the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere will not change. 
Introducing alternative methods of generating energy, such as transport fuels from biofuels, 
may depress the price of energy in the world markets and stimulate demand elsewhere. If they 
do not affect the extraction path of fossil fuel resources, alternative energy supplies will be 
consumed in addition to the energy contained in fossil fuels. 
Sinn (2008) coined the phrase ‘green paradox’ to represent the situations where policy actions 
taken to mitigate climate change unintentionally incite fossil-based fuel resource owners to 
speed up their resource extraction path, i.e., the anticipated reduced demand effect outweighs 
any benefit of delaying extraction. As Sinn expressed, the existence of a green paradox shows 
that ‘good intentions do not always breed good deeds.’ He further illustrates examples that 
lead to this situation, focusing on the effects of an increasing cash flow tax rate or an ad 
valorem tax on carbon, but also notes how gradually greening demand policies, such as 
subsidizing the production of a clean energy substitute, can have similar adverse consequences 
in terms of speeding up global warming. Sinn’s observations have sparked a collection of 
research, predominantly theoretical, to evaluate whether or not the paradox holds under more 
specific circumstances. Some of the findings are discussed below, but first let’s examine an 
example of how subsidizing the production of a clean energy substitute may lead to the green 
paradox. 
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To illustrate the concept of the green paradox, assume there exists an expensive perfect 
substitute, referred to as the backstop, to an exhaustible resource. This backstop is available in 
unlimited quantities in the market at a price of $200 per unit, the constant marginal cost of 
producing the backstop. Now, assume that the government decides that it wants to promote 
the use of this backstop and does so by offering to subsidize the producer’s cost of making the 
good by $100 per unit.  Reducing the marginal cost of the backstop producer to $100 ($200 less 
the $100 subsidy) and the market price at which the good will be available puts downward 
pressure on the maximum price that the non-renewable resource can receive in the market. 
The results of the implementation of this subsidy are to lower the choke price faced by the non-
renewable resource owners, the price at which demand for their resource falls to zero. Assume 
that it is optimal to fully exhaust the stock of the resource and that the price path follows 
Hotelling’s Principle and is increasing at the rate of interest. The reduced choke price 
encourages the exhaustible resource owners to lower prices and speed up extraction so that 
their entire resource stock is extracted before the market price reaches $100. Applied to the 
global market for transport fuels, let oil and biofuels represent the exhaustible resource and 
backstop, respectively. One can see that if the production of biofuels is promoted to mitigate 
climate change via a subsidy payment to producers in order to make the renewable fuel more 
price competitive with oil, the optimal response by the oil producers could undermine the 
planner’s initial objective. 
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Figure 4.1: Resource extraction and price paths with and without backstop subsidy 
 
In the figure above, the black lines represent the case without any subsidies to the backstop. 
One can clearly see that the price under both scenarios stops increasing once it reaches the 
price of the backstop - $200 in the case without the subsidy and $100 in the case with the 
subsidy. This is also the point when the reserves are exhausted. Note also that the prices under 
both scenarios are growing at the same rate of interest according to Hotelling’s Principle, an 
optimality condition derived in the previous chapter. The solid grey and black lines represent 
the resource extraction under the subsidy and no subsidy scenarios, respectively. The area 
under these curves is equal to the resource stock, the total amount of resource under the 
owner’s control. Also note that the resource extraction falls to zero at the same time that price 
reaches the price of the backstop, which is significantly earlier in the case with a subsidy to the 
backstop producers. If the subsidy was implemented to mitigate climate change, we would 
have a case of the green paradox.  
Changing the assumptions about extraction costs can lead to different conclusions about the 
green paradox. In fact, Gerlagh (2009) shows that increasing fossil fuel extraction costs as 
resources are depleted over time reduces the magnitude of the green paradox, while the 
paradox may vanish entirely if the backstop is considered to be an imperfect energy substitute. 
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Grafton et al. (2010) specifically analyze the impact of biofuel ad valorem production subsidies 
on fossil fuel resource owners extraction paths. They differentiate between a weak and strict 
green paradox, with the former existing when policies designed to reduce GHG emissions 
increase fossil fuel production. If the increased fuel production raises atmospheric GHG 
concentration levels, Grafton et al. (2010) refer to the outcome as a strict green paradox. The 
authors proceed to show that Sinn’s (2008) argument for the possibility of adverse supply side 
effects in the context of green taxes is equally valid in the context of biofuel subsidies. 
However, among other results, they demonstrate how, with a linear demand function for fuels 
and supply function of biofuels, an increase in biofuel subsidies will delay the date of 
exhaustion of a resource stock in both competitive and monopoly markets. This occurs when 
extraction costs are positive, despite decreasing the choke price faced by the fossil fuel 
resource owners. An increase in biofuel subsidies will have no effect on the date of exhaustion 
if extraction costs are zero.  
Withagen and van der Ploeg (2010) also explore the green paradox in the context of subsidizing 
renewable backstop technologies and, in contrast to Grafton et al. (2010), find that a backstop 
subsidy leads to an earlier exhaustion of non-renewables and to a faster rate of oil extraction. 
This occurs when the marginal extraction costs of non-renewables are less than the net cost of 
the backstop for any level of the stock implying that the non-renewable must be fully exhausted 
before the backstop takes over. This is similar to the results presented in Figure 4.1. 
Furthermore, the authors propose that the green paradox prevails when the resource owner is 
a monopolist and backstop prices are relatively high compared to the initial marginal cost of 
extraction. In fact, they note that if there is a substantial concern for the environment, it would 
be better to tax the clean backstop in order to postpone exhaustion. However, if the backstop is 
eventually cheaper to supply than oil, subsidizing the backstop leads to a larger amount of 
reserves left in situ and the green paradox need not hold. The specifications of their model 
prohibit simultaneous use of the exhaustible resource and backstop. 
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In objection to the Bush administration’s argument to focus resources on developing 
alternative energy sources versus ratifying a Kyoto type agreement with a limited number of 
participating countries, Hoel (2008) establishes a theoretical model to evaluate the effect of a 
reduction in the cost of a backstop technology on fossil fuels. He shows that carbon emissions 
are more likely to increase in the near future the higher is the elasticity of demand for the sum 
of the carbon resource and the substitute and the scarcer the carbon resource. 
While the results obtained in these papers and others shed interesting light on the dilemma at 
hand, most are very theoretical and none attempt to explain whether or not the green paradox 
holds in the context of RFS and blending mandate policies. The analysis contained in the 
following chapters is an attempt to conclude whether the weak and/or strict green paradoxes 
exist when these specific policies are employed to promote the use of biofuels in the transport 
sector. To clarify, the term weak green paradox will be used in this paper to represent the case 
when fossil fuel production is increased in the earlier periods of the subsequent models 
analyzed. It does not necessarily mean that the resource exhaustion date is earlier than the 
case without government intervention. The strict green paradox follows the definition used by 
Grafton et al. (2010). 
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5 Reference model 
The purpose of this modeling exercise is to compare and contrast the extraction path for oil, 
the non-renewable resource, including time until exhaustion, for the global transport sector 
under different policies adopted to promote the use of biofuels. Consequences of revised 
emissions paths are used to evaluate any impacts on the accumulation of GHG in the 
atmosphere and temperature changes. The results are then used to conclude whether or not 
the green paradox, in weak or strict form, is withheld. In this chapter, reference scenarios for 
competitive and monopoly markets in the absence of biofuel policies are reviewed. The 
following chapter looks at how the adoption of different biofuel policies affects the results of 
these reference scenarios. The first section within this chapter describes and discusses a set of 
comprehensive assumptions used throughout the paper in order to create the reference 
scenarios. Results of the reference models under perfect competition and monopoly market 
structures are then presented. The sensitivity of the results to some of the key assumptions 
made in developing the models is addressed in Appendix A. 
5.1 Assumptions 
5.1.1 Global demand for transport fuels 
Functional form 
The model assumes a linear demand function of the form         , where    represents 
the supply of oil and    represents the price of oil.  and   are parameters derived from 2006-
2010 actual volume and price data along with a review of estimated price elasticities. 
Consumption of fossil fuels is equal to the extraction. The constants,  and  , are derived given 
a price elasticity of demand,  , and the base period consumption and price levels as follows: 
          and    
   
  
. 
A characteristic of this demand function is that it ignores economic growth which would result 
in growth in demand; however, it is not completely disregarded. Instead, it is incorporated by 
treating the transport sector’s use of oil as a larger share than its current actual share. 
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Price elasticity 
The price elasticity was extrapolated by reviewing price and extraction path outcomes for 
competitive and monopoly market structures given current consumption, price and resource 
stock levels. The elasticity that resulted in a 2011-2015 price which could reasonably be 
expected to occur was then used to derive the parameters used in the demand function.  
The long-run price elasticity for oil in industries and households (including services) varies 
between -0.1 and -0.6, with a weighted average of -0.37 for households. In the transport sector, 
the elasticity is thought to be on the lower end of the range due to fewer substitution 
possibilities compared to stationary oil (Aure et al., 2005). Substantial taxes and subsidies, 
particularly in non-OECD regions, puts additional downward pressure on the price elasticity. For 
instance, IEA (2010c) estimates that 37 large developing countries spent about $557 billion on 
fossil fuel subsidies in 2008 with Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India and China topping the list. Liu 
(2004) found the short-run and long-run price elasticities for motor gasoline in OECD countries 
to be -0.19 to -0.60, respectively, and compares his findings with results from other studies. 
Estimates vary across studies, most likely due to the specification of the models and data sets 
analyzed; however, empirical studies consistently find low values for short-term price 
elasticities that increase in the long-term. For instance, Pindyck (1979) found the long-run 
gasoline price elasticity to be -1.31 in the transport sector in OECD countries (Liu, 2004). I found 
that an elasticity of -0.25 calculated parameters in the demand function that justify a 2011-
2015 weighted average gross price for the competitive and monopoly scenarios, with constant 
marginal extraction costs, of $112.9 per bbl of oil. The weights are based on a blended market 
structure with OPEC acting as a monopoly and providing 39.9% of the supply from 2010 actual 
figures (IEA, 2011). 
 
Base price and quantity  
The 2010 base price of $79.61/bbl used is the annual average price for the Brent blend, a crude 
oil marker for crude oil sourced from the North Sea (EIA, 2011a). Data for 2006-2009 actual 
world demand for crude oil was gathered from IEA’s Oil Market Reports 2010 statistical 
supplement (IEA, 2010d). The 2010 figure is from IEA’s February oil market report (IEA, 2011). 
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The percent of oil consumed by the global transport sector was 61.4% in 2008 (IEA, 2010a). 
Given that the share of oil consumed by transport is expected to grow as the wealth of the 
developing countries continues to rise and fossil fuel substitution possibilities continue to be 
limited in the sector more so than the electricity and industry sectors, a larger share is used in 
the model. In fact, the IEA predicts that the entire increase in world oil demand between 2009 
and 2035 will come from non-OECD countries as OECD demand drops (IEA, 2010c). They also 
predict that the transport sector will account for almost all of the increase in oil demand during 
the aforementioned period, with China alone accounting for half of the global increase in oil 
used for transport (IEA, 2010c). Further, using a higher share compensates slightly for the lack 
of growth specified in the demand function. For these reasons, the models assume a long-term 
constant share of oil used by the transport sector of 75%, underscoring the importance of the 
development of transportation energy use in assessing future trends in demand for crude oil.  
5.1.2 Other assumptions 
Stock 
The calculation of the total stock of crude oil available for use by the transport sector considers 
proven reserves, projected future increases in oil recovery of these proven reserves and 
undiscovered reserves. The volume of ultimately recoverable reserves is highly uncertain 
mainly due to difficulties in estimating how much oil was originally in place in the world and 
evaluating how much of the resource can be recovered profitably – which also requires 
assumptions about technology and costs of production inputs, among others. British 
Petroleum’s widely cited figure for proven oil reserves for year-end 2009 is 1,331 billion bbl (BP 
Global, 2010). Proven reserves of oil are generally taken to be those quantities that geological 
and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future 
from known reservoirs under existing economic and geological conditions. The reserves include 
gas condensate and natural gas liquids (NGLs) as well as crude oil.  
Reserve growth, increases in reserves that occur as oil or gas fields are developed and 
produced, are estimated to be 76.1% of proven reserves. This is based on a ratio of reserve 
growth to proven reserves for global oil and NGLs derived from a U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 
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2000).5 Using current proven reserves, the ratio justifies a current reserve growth estimate of 
1,015 billion bbl. Almost half of the increase in proven reserves in recent years has come from 
revisions to estimates of reserves in fields already in production as opposed to new discoveries 
(IEA, 2010c). Undiscovered reserves are estimated to be 1,073 billion bbl (USGS, 2000 and 
2008) for a total of 3,421 billion bbl of ultimately recoverable reserves. This estimate falls 
within other contemporary ultimately recoverable reserve estimates ranging from 2,000-4,300 
billion bbl (UKERC, 2009). Applying transports use at 75%, one can predict a stock of 2,566 
billion bbl of conventional oil equivalent destined for use in the transport sector.  
I have chosen to exclude unconventional fuel stock estimates including oil sands in Canada and 
Venezuela and Gas-to-liquid (GTL) and Coal-to-liquid (CTL) technologies. Canada and Venezuela 
oil sand deposits are projected to contain 1.0–3.6 trillion bbl of recoverable oil; however, the 
process of making liquid fuels from oil sands can generate up to 6.5 times the amount of GHGs 
per barrel of final product compared to the production of conventional oil. Well-to-wheel 
estimates project that the oil sand fuels emit 4-40% more GHGs than conventional oil 
(Charpentier et al., 2009). The higher emissions are primarily due to the higher energy 
requirements for extracting bitumen, a sticky, tar-like form of petroleum, and upgrading it into 
a synthetic crude oil. In addition, Withagen and van der Ploeg (2010) show that in the case of 
this ‘dirty’ and expensive backstop coupled with concern for the climate, it may be optimal to 
fully exhaust oil and gas reserves prior to using oil sands. 
A more appropriate way to think of GTL and CTL may be as a backstop technology that will be 
adopted when transport energy prices approach the choke point where demand for 
conventional fuels falls to zero. Assuming that the cost to produce these fuels will be 
prohibitively high, especially if a carbon tax is implemented and applied to CTL production, 
justifies their exclusion. Further, we could argue that the cost to produce 2nd generation 
biofuels is cheaper in all periods analyzed and that it is likely more economical to use GTL in 
other sectors. The total size of the stock of these unconventional reserves is highly uncertain, 
but potentially as large as 2-3 trillion bbl may be economically recoverable (IEA, 2010c). 
                                                          
5
 http://pubs.usgs.gov/dds/dds-060/ESpt4.html#Table 
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Time horizon  
2006-2010 is considered the base period, i.e.,    , and actual resource price and extraction 
levels are used and fixed for the period. Results are analyzed for 48 five year periods with 2250 
being the terminal year. 
Discount rate 
A constant 2% compounded annual discount rate for a period rate of 10.41% is used, implying 
period payments or foregone income is invested at the beginning of each of the periods. It is 
also assumed that the monopoly and competitive market firms face equal required rates of 
return which also reflect the social planner’s discount rate. This allows us to directly compare 
the results derived for the two market structures. 
Extraction costs 
The reference model assumes constant marginal extraction costs which may be a reasonable 
assumption if one believes that technological development may directly offset any increased 
cost in extracting the more difficult to reach reserves. The models assume a fixed level of 
extraction costs of $20/bbl.  Major energy producing companies based in the U.S. incurred 
worldwide total lifting costs of $11.51/bbl of oil equivalent (boe) in 2009, down $1.19/boe, 
reversing an almost decade-long upward trend. Worldwide finding costs, which include 
exploration and development expenditures, were $18.31/boe, for total worldwide upstream 
costs of $29.81/boe (EIA, 2011b). Alternatively, Deutsche Bank estimated 2009 worldwide 
average production costs for 90% of the world’s oil production to be $6.60/bbl and in a 2007 
study, estimate total costs, including capital and exploration costs, on average to be $15.20/bbl 
(Karl, 2010). Note that the $20 marginal extraction cost is more in line with the average costs 
found in the literature as opposed to a marginal cost, the theoretically correct cost to use. The 
actual marginal cost may be higher than $20/bbl, although the upper ranges of the average 
values are skewed due to the inclusion of Canadian oil sands, which are not included in the 
calculation of total available stock in these models. On the other hand, they exclude refining 
costs.  
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Perfect competition model 
Since solving the perfect competition model by maximizing profits requires given market prices 
for each period in question, a social planner’s approach is taken throughout. The social 
planner’s problem is to maximize the present value of social welfare over the time period 
analyzed by choosing the appropriate resource extraction and price path for a given period of 
time. The 2nd fundamental theorem of welfare economics which states that any Pareto optimal 
outcome can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium, under certain assumptions and 
conditions, allows us to solve the problems in this way. In other words, the optimal resource 
extraction and price paths derived from the social planner’s perspective, ceteris paribus, also 
represents the profit maximizing extraction and price paths in a perfectly competitive market.  
 
This model uses the inverse demand function        
     
 
. Define the social utility from 
consuming a quantity of the resource in each period as            
 
 
   , or      
 
 
    
 
  
  
 , an increasing and concave function of resource extraction. Note that by 
differentiating total utility with respect to   , we obtain 
  
  
       which states that the 
marginal social utility of resource use equals the price of the resource. Further, assume that the 
intertemporal social welfare function is utilitarian. Then the present value of social welfare over 
time can be expressed as     
 
 
    
 
  
  
       
      
 
   
 This is the objective function 
that is maximized in the perfect competition models. 
Methodology 
The models are built in excel and the solver tool is used to calculate the optimal extraction and 
price paths for each of the scenarios.  
The table below summarizes the value of the parameters calculated based on different 
elasticities assumed, along with implied choke price (equal to   ) and     , the price for the 
2011-2015 period. The parameters used for the reference models are highlighted in grey. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of parameters 
    Gross      
      Choke price Perfect competition Monopoly 
(0.10) 129.514 0.148 $875.71 $71.63 $451.47 
(0.20) 141.288 0.296 $477.66 $51.50 $251.32 
(0.25) 147.175 0.370 $398.05 $47.68 $211.33 
(0.30) 153.062 0.444 $344.98 $45.52 $184.70 
(0.40) 164.863 0.592 $278.64 $42.26 $151.46 
(0.50) 176.610 0.739 $238.83 $40.70 $131.57 
(0.60) 188.384 0.887 $212.29 $39.80 $118.36 
 
5.1.3 Emissions and climate impacts 
The conversion of oil consumption in the transport sector to carbon emissions requires the 
calculation of the carbon content of crude oil followed by its input into a model that calculates 
the carbon’s accumulation in the atmosphere and impact on the temperature. The average 
theoretical kilogram (kg) of CO2 per kg of crude oil is 3.15.
6 A specific gravity (ratio of density of 
crude oil to CO2) of 0.85, implies a conversion ratio of CO2 kg/crude oil kg of 2.68.
7 The CO2 to 
carbon (C) factor, the ratio of molecular weight of CO2 to C, of 3.67 (44/12) gives us 0.73 C 
kg/liter of crude oil or 116.21 C kg/bbl. This calculation is summarized in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Summary of crude oil carbon content 
Crude oil Liter  Barrel 
Specific gravity (kg/liter) 0.85   0.148  
CO2 kg/kg 3.15   0.296  
CO2 kg/ 2.68   426.12 
  
 
 CO2 to C factor 3.67  
 C kg/ 0.73   116.21  
 
The basic methodology of converting emissions to the accumulation of GHG stock in the 
atmosphere and resulting temperature changes comes from a model created by Bjart 
Holtsmark, Statistics Norway, which is based on Höhne and Blok (2005) and includes 
calculations of the following effects: CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) emissions on concentrations; radiative forcing, the ability of heat radiation to escape 
through the atmosphere, and global-average surface-air temperature change. The business as 
                                                          
6
 Energistatistikk 1998, vedlegg B 
7
 http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/convert.html 
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usual (BAU) scenario emissions used in the model is based on the IPCC’s A1 scenario, 
characterized by rapid economic growth, a global population that reaches 9 billion by 2050 and 
rapid technological development that improves energy efficiency. This paper will only look at 
how the estimated change in the transport sector’s carbon emissions due to the use of certain 
biofuel policies contributes to the stock of GHG’s and temperature changes for the future 
periods.  
The model uses an initial atmospheric GHG stock of 389.78 parts per million (ppm), the annual 
mean concentration for 2010.8 Since the BAU emissions in the model are not broken out by 
sector, in order to derive BAU emissions excluding the transport sector for the reference model, 
the transport sector’s emissions are assumed to represent 27.7% of the total BAU carbon 
emissions. This share is based on the estimate of transport’s base period (2006-2010) carbon 
emissions used throughout the models in this paper. The share is assumed to be constant 
throughout future periods in the climate model. These emissions are subtracted from the total 
BAU emissions in order to extrapolate ‘reference’ case emissions from all sources other than 
transport. The BAU transport emissions that are subtracted from the total BAU carbon 
emissions are replaced with the emissions calculated by the models used in this paper. The 
emissions derived from the policy scenarios are then compared to those generated by the 
reference case models. GHG accumulation and temperature changes are calculated from the 
various emissions paths that result from the optimal resource extraction paths generated from 
the reference and policy scenario models. BAU emissions are projected to increase through 
2080 and then decline. The middle line represents emissions from all sectors other than 
transport. These are taken as given and are added to the emissions path generated by the 
reference and policy scenarios for the transport sector to discern any changes in the 
accumulation in GHGs and temperature changes. 
  
                                                          
8
 Monthly average concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) and republished by CO2Now.org, where the number was acquired on 2 March 2011. The 
data is measured at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii. 
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Figure 5.1: BAU emissions 
 
5.2 Results of reference models 
The numerical results of the reference models are presented in the following table. Note that 
     actually represents            and is the meaningful result to review since      is an 
actual, fixed value. Furthermore,   stands for the period in which the resource is fully 
exhausted. Reference scenario resource extraction and price paths are presented below the 
numerical results. 
Table 5.3: Numerical results of reference models 
 
Perfect competition  Monopoly 
Gross      $47.68  $211.33 
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Figure 5.2: Reference scenario resource extraction paths 
 
 
The steeper resource extraction path in grey undertaken in the competitive market in grey 
compared to the monopoly in black is clear in Figure 5.2. This is a result of the monopoly’s 
ability to use their market power to influence prices. They set higher prices, relative to the 
competitive firms, when demand is more inelastic, a characteristic of the linear demand 
functional form chosen. The monopolist’s ability to strategically set prices above what is socially 
optimal is also evident in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3: Reference scenario price paths 
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The optimal extraction of non-renewable resources requires prices to rise over time and the 
monopolist’s optimal price path grows at a slower rate than that of the competitive firm due to 
the increasing elasticity of demand as price rises. This means that the monopolist will charge 
higher prices and reduce extraction in earlier periods compared to the competitive firm. The 
results presented above are consistent with the optimality conditions derived in the chapter 3. 
Notice that there are quantity and price corrections in the first period relative to actual values 
for the 2006-2010 period in both reference cases presented. This is to be expected since the 
perfect competition and pure monopoly markets represent the extreme boundaries within 
which the actual cartel-fringe market most likely operates. The direction of the corrections are 
consistent with what theory would lead us to predict. 
The reference scenario’s estimated carbon emissions and atmospheric GHG concentrations for 
the resource extraction paths discussed above are presented in Figure 5.4. Focus is placed on 
the period ending 2100. 
Figure 5.4: Reference scenario transport carbon emissions and GHG concentrations 
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much more muted. By 2100, despite higher cumulative emissions of 94.4 Gt C in a competitive 
market, GHG concentration levels are just 17.0 ppm greater. As evidenced in the above figure, 
there is an extremely large lag between variances in current emissions and their accumulation 
in the atmosphere, a result of the non-linear relationship between emissions and radiative 
forcing. This relationship also has implications for the temperature effects. 
Table 5.4: Reference scenario temperature changes 
 Perfect competition  Monopoly 
 GHG (ppm) Temp. change (°C)  GHG (ppm) Temp. change (°C) 
2030 433.2 1.21°  425.5 1.17° 
2050 487.7 1.99°  475.3 1.91° 
2075 561.4 2.87°  545.4 2.77° 
2100 621.1 3.45°  604.1 3.35° 
 
By 2100, the faster extraction path undertaken by the competitive firm leads to a temperature 
increase of just 0.10°C higher than that of a monopoly resource owner. This is because 
emissions that occurred as early as before 1900 are still affecting today’s climate as they affect 
the decay of more recent emissions (Höhne and Blok, 2005). In fact, Røgeberg et al. (2010) 
recognize that the stabilization of global GHG emissions would have negligent impacts on the 
current speed of climate change. Even with a rapid reduction of emissions, global warming is 
likely to continue to occur for several decades. This message is consistent and apparent 
throughout the results presented. 
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6 Biofuel policies 
6.1 Modeling of biofuel policies  
Before diving into the policy scenario models and results, some overarching assumptions that 
are made in the following analyses require attention. First, the models assume all the energy 
required to produce biofuels comes from biofuels and therefore fulfills any increase in the 
demand for energy needed to produce biofuels. This also means that the supply curve 
presented below is a net supply of biofuels. Furthermore, climate impacts of the various results 
assume that biofuels net emissions are zero as discussed in section 2.1. Climate impacts of the 
policies explored are discussed at the end of the chapter. 
On the production side, no constraints on the resource owner’s ability to react to biofuel 
policies are assumed, i.e., they are completely flexible in their production. This may be a strong 
assumption since, as observed by Krautkraemer (1998), the industry is capital intensive and it 
may be very costly to adjust extraction rates in response to a change in the price path. 
However, this exercise assumes that the policies are known far in advance and the model has a 
very long time horizon.  
The same market price holds for oil and biofuels so that            , where         , 
with    representing biofuels production. In addition, biofuel production costs are assumed to 
be $1.00/liter or $159/boe, in line with current and future cost estimates presented in chapter 
2. Further assume that up to 100 billion boe can be supplied at this cost, after which feedstock 
constraints in terms of total biomass available restrict any additional increase in production. 
This implies an infinitely elastic global supply curve for biofuels until producers reach a capacity 
of 100 billion boe. The 100 billion boe and constant marginal costs are justified given the 
existence of an abundant supply of cellulosic material and estimates of feasible bioenergy 
production presented by the IEA. This capacity is well within the expert assessments of the total 
potential energy available from biomass discussed in chapter 2. Further, in the presence of an 
RFS policy, as long as the marginal cost of biofuels is less than the price of oil, the supply of 
biofuels is decided entirely by the RFS.  
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Figure 6.1: Net supply of biofuels 
 
The supply curve in Figure 6.1 is an approximation of an actual supply curve that is more likely a 
gradually increasing function of quantity, convex in quantity until it reaches 100 bbl boe and 
capacity constraints prohibit additional increases in supply. Or the supply can be envisioned as 
presented, but with the vertical line gradually shifting out in conjunction with the increasing 
RFS. Note that it is implicitly assumed that the expansion of production capacity coincides with 
the volumes required to meet the RFS or blending mandate’s standards. The assumption about 
the supply of biofuels is particularly important for designing the scaled up and prolonged RFS, 
relative to that which the U.S. has implemented, which is modeled and discussed in more detail 
in the following section.  
6.1.1 RFS policy  
In order to analyze the effect of a RFS-type policy on the fossil fuel owners’ extraction path, 
some assumptions had to be made to incorporate the policy into the reference models. The 
policy is based on the U.S. RFS which specifies levels of biofuels to be used through 2022 (EPA, 
2010). An annual growth in the standard of 5% following 2022 is assumed through 2090, after 
which the supply is considered to remain constant at 100.0 billion boe per period, consistent 
with the supply curve shown above. This is a conservative estimate of actual total available 
capacity compared to the range of biofuel production potential estimates and leads to results 
fairly consistent in terms of biofuels share of total transport fuel demand presented by IEA 
publications.  
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Actual data for global biofuels production was used for the 2006-2010 period (IEA, 2010d and 
2011), adjusted for energy content based on a 2008 share of ethanol and diesel production of 
77.1% and 22.9%, respectively (IEA, 2010b).9 The values put biofuel consumption at 1.5% of 
total global transport energy consumed (biofuel and crude oil) for the 2006-2010 period. The 
RFS is translated into a global policy by scaling up the U.S. policy and extending it to future 
periods per the assumptions highlighted above.  The scaling up occurs by assuming that the U.S. 
provides a constant share of the total available global biofuels each period to fulfill the RFS 
requirements. A share of 45.3% is used based on 2010 actual data converted to boe (EIA, 
2011c).  
6.1.2 Blending mandate policy 
The blending mandate policy used in the model is based on the 10% by 2020 objective adopted 
by the EU. This means that biofuels represent a required percentage share of total energy 
consumed by the transport sector, i.e., oil plus biofuels. The policy used in the model assumes a 
5% blending target for the 2011-2015 period which increases by 2.5% per period. The blending 
mandate ultimately reaches 50% in period 19 (2101-2105), after which it remains constant at 
50%.  
6.2 RFS results 
The numerical results of the RFS models are presented in the table below, along with the 
reference models output for comparison.  
Table 6.1: Numerical results of RFS models 
 
Perfect competition  Monopoly 
 
Reference  RFS  Reference  RFS 
Gross      $47.68  $21.79  $211.33  $204.81 
     
129.6  138.0  69.0  69.4 
  27 (2141-2145)  42 (2216 – 2220)  45 (2231-2235)  Not exhausted 
  
 
    
Share of biofuels used in transport:     
2020   3.5%    6.7% 
2030   6.4%    12.0% 
2050   14.1%    24.5% 
                                                          
9
 A liter of ethanol contains 0.66 liters of gasoline equivalent. A liter of biodiesel contains 0.89 liters of diesel equivalent. 
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Compared to the reference scenario, implementing the RFS leads to lower initial prices and 
higher initial extraction in both markets, although the impact is much more pronounced in the 
competitive market.  Also, results show that the exhaustion period is actually extended in both 
markets despite the higher initial extraction levels. More detailed figures of price and extraction 
paths are presented below and accompanied by a descriptive analysis of the intuition behind 
the results.  
6.2.1 Perfect competition 
Despite the delayed exhaustion date, the RFS induces competitive resource owners to speed up 
extraction in earlier periods, confirming that the weak green paradox holds. A lower initial price 
is set so that the net price may grow according to Hotelling’s Principle before reaching a 
modified, reduced choke price, at which point the resource is fully exhausted.  
Figure 6.2: Competitive RFS price path 
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Figure 6.3: Competitive RFS resource extraction path and biofuel production 
 
In the presence of the RFS, the resource owners will extract 138.0 billion bbl versus 129.5 in the 
first period with optimal initial prices reduced to $21.79 versus $47.68 in order to sell the 
additional supply. The RFS brings about higher extraction through 2050, lower extraction 
through 2130 and then higher extraction for the remaining periods until exhaustion, compared 
with the reference scenario. Note that the kink in the extraction path under the RFS scenario 
takes place when the targeted levels of biofuel use stops growing and remains constant at 100 
billion boe. The higher initial extraction under the RFS can be thought of as the resource 
owner’s anticipation of reduced demand for their product in future periods.  
The optimal net price path grows at the rate of interest according to Hotelling’s Principle and 
the resource is fully exhausted. In this instance, the presence of the RFS is the same as reducing 
demand for the resource in each period. The new choke price faced by the resource owners, 
the price at which the residual demand for transport oil falls to zero, is $131.58 instead of 
$398.05, derived from the demand for the non-renewable resource            , with 
       and     . The revised choke price and Hotelling’s Principle leads to the following 
price path                
         . The initial price must be lower than the reference 
case to allow for the entire resource to be exhausted given the lower choke price. It is clear that 
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conclude that the RFS, as specified, leads to a weak green paradox when a competitive market 
is supplying the non-renewable oil. 
Unfortunately, the results of this analysis are highly sensitive to the assumptions made about 
the RFS, stressing the dramatic effects that uncertainty about future policy can play in current 
extraction decisions. For instance, since biofuel consumption affects the price of the resource, if 
the quantity of biofuels is modeled so that it continues to grow to 141.9 or beyond, the optimal 
solution for periods of positive resource extraction/production is to produce at a level such that 
the market price will be equal to $20, the resource owner’s marginal cost of extraction. This is a 
solution we expect to see in a competitive market for resources that aren’t subject to scarcity 
constraints. At biofuel standards above 141.9, the market price is below $20 and it is no longer 
economical for resource owners to extract. This also results in an initial period of higher 
extraction than under the reference scenario; however, a portion of the resource stock will not 
be extracted.  
6.2.2 Monopoly 
Unlike the competitive market, despite a negligible increase in first period production, the 
existence of the RFS actually prompts a monopoly to reduce extraction in earlier periods, 
therefore allowing us to conclude that the green paradox does not hold in weak or strict form. 
Extraction and prices decline while the RFS increases over time until 2095, after which biofuel 
production remains constant (100.0 billion boe per period) as well as monopoly extraction (20.9 
billion bbl per period) and prices ($75.80). The monopoly will not extract the entire resource, 
leaving nearly 895 billion bbl in situ. Therefore, a monopoly producer does not follow a 
Hotelling Principle, but produces as though the resource constraint were not activated so that 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost during all periods. 
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Figure 6.4: Monopoly RFS gross price path 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Monopoly RFS resource extraction path and biofuel production 
 
 
The difference between the initial prices and quantities extracted in the first period between 
the reference and RFS cases are so microscopic and somewhat counterintuitive to the rest of 
the results that not much needs to be said about them other than that they are results solely 
related to the specification of the RFS. The development of the price and extraction paths 
paints a much more interesting picture. An important distinguishing feature of this model is 
that the monopolist can use its market power to influence prices by way of the quantity it 
$211 
$389 
$204 (RFS)
$75 (RFS) 
-
$50 
$100 
$150 
$200 
$250 
$300 
$350 
$400 
$450 
P
ri
ce
 (
U
SD
)
Year
Reference RFS
69
21 
100 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
B
ill
io
n
s 
o
f 
b
ar
re
ls
 o
f 
o
il 
e
q
u
iv
al
e
n
t
Year
Reference RFS Biofuels
 42 
 
chooses to produce; however, it cannot control the amount of biofuels dumped into the 
market.  
 
Hoel (1978) proves that a monopoly provider of a non-renewable resource is affected by the 
existence of a perfect substitute for the resource supplied by a competitive market and will 
react to the backstop in two phases. In the first phase, net marginal revenue will rise at the rate 
of interest until the price reaches its upper limit, the price of the backstop, at the end of the 
phase. This is a result of the monopolist not being able to sell resources at a price exceeding the 
competitive substitute price. However, it is assumed that he can sell as much of the resource as 
he wishes within the confines of demand when the price equals the cost of the backstop. This 
gives rise to the second phase which lasts until the resource is fully exhausted, during which the 
price is constant and equal to the cost of the backstop. The results show how a monopoly 
provider can take advantage of limit pricing in order to increase profits when threatened by a 
substitute product. Hoel (1978) further shows that the resource is extracted at a faster rate 
before exhaustion occurs when a substitute exists.  
Unlike the problem presented by Hoel (1978), this monopolist is unable to influence when the 
backstop, e.g., biofuels, are introduced in the market by manipulating his price and extraction 
path which leads to significantly different results. We know from basic micro economic theory 
that at the profit-maximizing monopolist’s choice of output, marginal revenue must equal 
marginal cost. When resource scarcity is a factor, an optimal extraction path requires that, in 
the presence of extraction costs, net marginal revenue grows at the discount rate according to 
Hotelling’s Principle. However, as Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1975) show, when the constraint 
on the available stock is not binding, i.e.,       
 
 
, the shadow price on the available stock, 
  , equals zero and the net marginal revenue equals zero in all periods. Furthermore, marginal 
revenue must be non-decreasing over time. If marginal revenue is declining over time, a 
monopoly could increase profits by extracting more in earlier periods.  
Given the specifications of the model, it is easy to show that marginal revenue is    
  
 
 
       and price is                . Total differentiation of the equations 
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allows us to evaluate how    and    must change for a given change in biofuel consumption,   , 
in order to fulfill certain assumptions about changes in marginal revenue over time. Total 
differentiation gives us10 
     
 
 
          (8) 
     
 
 
         (9) 
With a growing biofuel standard provided by the RFS,     . Equation (8) states that marginal 
revenue can only increase if      and        
 
 
   , i.e., the decrease in    is more than 
half of the increase in   . Equation (9) says that price can only be growing if the decline in    
more than offsets the increase in    so that the term in the second set of parentheses on the 
right hand of the equation is negative.  
One can derive the maximum amount of resource a monopoly owner will produce during the 
periods when the biofuel standard,   , is 100.0 billion boe using the equations for    and    
and setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, $20. This gives an extraction of 20.9 billion 
bbl per period. Any further increase in production would reduce marginal revenue below the 
cost of extraction. If marginal revenue were to grow, extraction must continue to decline from 
this point forward. Using this level of extraction for 2095-2250 one can work backwards to 
determine the total amount of resource that will be extracted during the entire period. 
Comparing the cases where marginal revenue is growing versus constant, the former requires a 
greater decline in extraction per period, implying a higher level of extraction in the earlier 
periods during which the RFS is growing. However, this leads to lower prices and profits during 
these periods compared to the case where marginal revenue is constant and the firm could 
increase profits by delaying extraction. Therefore, a profit maximizing firm would prefer to 
produce at a level that kept marginal revenue constant over time.  
                                                          
10
 Equation (8) is derived as follows: From (10),    
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 44 
 
Using      
 
 
    from (8) to calculate the change in extraction per period gives a 
maximum value for the entire amount of resource that will be extracted during the period of 
1,670 billion barrels, much less than the total available stock. Furthermore, from (9) we can see 
that the price must be declining during periods of increasing biofuel production since the 
decrease in extraction is less than the increase in biofuel production. When biofuel production 
is constant prices are also constant. These results affirm the outcomes presented in the figures 
above, with declining extraction and prices while the RFS is growing. 
Following the initial period of ratcheting up the biofuel RFS, during which the monopolist 
maximized profit by extracting at a rate such that MR=MC, one would expect the monopoly 
producer to adjust their production plan such that it follows the Hotelling Principle until the 
resource is fully exhausted. This is because with a constant level of biofuels in the market, the 
monopolist will maximize profit by gradually reducing production in order to sell at higher 
prices in the future to offset any effects of discounting. Given the large size of the remaining 
stock at this point, one would have to extend the model to include additional periods in order 
to see this adjustment. Furthermore, excel’s solver tool is most likely not accurate enough to 
account for the infinitesimal discounting effects that far into the future. 
The nature of the RFS used in this model leads to two main phases of extraction. First, while the 
RFS is increasing until 2095, resource extraction and prices will be declining. After 2095, prices 
and resource extraction will remain constant. These results are consistent with story presented 
in the graphs above and a result of a profit-maximizing monopoly producer choosing 
production levels such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Therefore, assuming that 
transport oil is provided by a monopolist, the adoption of an RFS policy will not induce the 
resource owner to speed up extraction so the green paradox does not hold. 
6.3 Blending mandate results 
The numerical results for the blending mandate scenarios are presented in the table below 
alongside the reference case results for comparison.  
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Table 6.2: Numerical results of blending mandate models 
 
Perfect competition  Monopoly 
 
 
Reference  Blending mandate  Reference  Blending mandate 
 Gross      $47.68  $37.29  $211.33  $209.03 
      
129.6  128.6  69.0  67.4 
   27 (2141-2145)  41 (2211–2215)  45 (2231-2235)  Not exhausted 
 
 
       
 Biofuels used in transport (billions of boe)     
 2020   6.8    5.3 
 2030   16.3    8.9 
 2050   27.9    16.0 
  
In both markets, initial extraction is reduced and the time until resource exhaustion is 
extended, a climate friendly result. This can be thought of as a response by the producers to the 
use of biofuels being tied to their production levels. Every additional unit extracted has not only 
a direct effect on the price, but also requires a corresponding increase in biofuel consumption 
which reduces price even further. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the extraction path 
will be flatter under the blending mandate scenario due to this externality. The green paradox 
does not hold as the incentive to delay extraction to keep current prices higher more than 
offsets the incentive to extract today. This is not so unusual given that we would expect prices 
to increase and production to decline in the future, meaning that biofuel consumption, since 
it’s simply a share of fossil-based fuels, will also decline in the future. This puts less pressure on 
the future residual demand for fossil-based fuels. 
6.3.1 Perfect competition 
Although the first period price and extraction in the presence of the blending mandate are very 
similar to the reference scenario, the optimal price and extraction paths in the presence of the 
biofuel policy develop much differently. In fact, the net price is growing at a decreasing rate 
over time while the blending mandate is increasing as opposed to a constant rate of interest 
like the reference scenario. This is most likely due to the fact that the benefit of delaying 
resource extraction further is declining as the mandated use of biofuels is increasing. In other 
words, the more that the mandate is expected to grow in the future, the larger the incentive to 
extract more today. Overall, current extraction is reduced and the resource is exhausted at a 
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later date than under the reference scenario. Note that the resource is fully exhausted when 
the price reaches the original choke point of $398. A total of 1,373 billion boe of biofuels is 
consumed. 
Figure 6.6: Competitive blending mandate price path 
 
Figure 6.7: Competitive blending mandate resource extraction path and biofuel production 
 
 
The following mathematical analysis supports the results presented above. Total demand for 
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   represents the blending mandate requirement, expressed as a percentage of total energy 
consumption. 
The above equation implies that                   and, that        . Further, let   
represent the marginal cost of producing biofuels. 
Using the social planners objective function described in Section 5.1.2 with modifications to 
account for the blending mandate, defined above, we can solve the revised maximization 
problem using control theory. The current value Hamiltonian becomes: 
    
 
 
           
 
  
           
 
                
Maximizing with respect to    yields the following first order conditions: 
   
  
  
 
 
         
 
 
           
             (10) 
         
   
  
 (11) 
From (11), since the resource stock does not enter into the Hamiltonian equation we know that 
 
  
 
    (12) 
Substituting                   simplifies (10) to  
                    (13) 
From (12) we know that this modified resource rent should grow at the rate of interest over 
time. Compared to the basic Hotelling Principle followed in the reference scenario, this 
resource rent is further reduced by a fraction of the marginal cost of producing biofuels. 
Therefore, the existence of the biofuel mandate is similar to increasing the marginal extraction 
cost of the nonrenewable resource and we would expect to see an extraction path that is 
delayed relative to the reference scenario. Furthermore, (13) suggests that the effect of this 
increase in cost is enhanced as the blending mandate is increased. Taking the time derivative of 
(13) gives us  
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                    (14) 
Dividing (14) by (13) results in the following equation for the optimal price path 
                 
                 
 
 
      
   (15) 
Dissecting equation (15) allows us to draw the following conclusions: 
(i) The effect of                  in the numerator depends on the dynamics of 
the blending mandate as well as the difference between the market price and the 
marginal cost of biofuels. If the blending mandate is constant,     , or     , the 
term disappears from the equation. If the blending mandate is increasing like it is in 
the earlier periods of the model,      and one must look at the variance between 
the market price and the marginal cost of biofuels to determine the direction of the 
effect. For     , the mandate is increasing and the market price is greater than 
the marginal cost of producing biofuels, the term reduces the growth in the gross 
price path and calls for slower extraction of the natural resource. For     , the 
mandate is increasing while the market price is less than the cost of producing 
biofuels and the term prompts the growth in the price path and extraction to speed 
up. This could be because society is losing welfare by consuming biofuels that are 
expensive relative to the price of other substitutes available in the market, in this 
case, oil. It happens to be the case in the model that the market price is less than 
$159, the marginal cost of producing a biofuel barrel of oil equivalent, for all periods 
during which the biofuel mandate is growing. 
(ii) The effect of                in the denominator is essentially the same as 
increasing the constant marginal cost of extracting an exhaustible resource in the 
absence of a biofuel policy. The mandate has this effect because more biofuels, 
which cost money to produce, are used as the oil resource extraction is increased. 
This provides an incentive to reduce the resource extraction rate and extend the 
resource exhaustion date. It is also the case that, since the marginal cost of 
producing biofuels is greater than the marginal extraction cost, the higher the 
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blending requirement, the stronger incentive the resource owner has to delay 
extraction. 
It turns out that the size of the effect of (i), when the blending mandate is increasing each 
period, is much smaller than the size of (ii) and the gap is growing as the blending requirement 
becomes increasingly larger. Therefore we would expect to see resource extraction and 
exhaustion delayed and the price growing at a decreasing rate while the blending mandate is 
increasing. When the mandate level stabilizes, the growth in the modified resource rent should 
also stabilize, although at a rate lower than the discount rate. This means that the rate at which 
the gross and net price grows will increase until the resource is fully exhausted. This is 
consistent with the results we see in figures above. 
6.3.2 Monopoly 
The monopoly producer’s results are presented below. The monopolist produces such that 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost in the first period at a price of $209. This price is kept 
constant and extraction is reduced while the blending mandate is increasing in order to prevent 
marginal revenue from decreasing. Once the blending mandate reaches 50% and remains 
constant, resource production and price remain constant. Less than the full stock is extracted, 
leaving 442.1 billion bbl in situ. A total of 1,401 billion boe of biofuels is consumed.  
Figure 6.8: Monopoly blending mandate gross price path 
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Figure 6.9: Monopoly blending mandate resource extraction path and biofuel production 
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The dynamic efficiency equation is still 
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amount of resource extracted per period can be calculated from the revised demand function 
for the resource, which is clearly declining as the blending mandate is increased. 
If net marginal revenue, the left hand side of (16), is to grow at the rate of interest, extraction 
would have to decline over time so even less of the total resource stock would be extracted. 
More would be left in situ, but this can’t be optimal since the market price is well above the 
marginal extraction cost so there are still profits to be made from extracting additional units. 
To see how the price path would develop if the entire resource was exhausted, take the time 
derivative of (16) which gives us         Dividing this expression by (16) and using the dynamic 
efficiency condition leads to the following expression to describe how the price path should 
develop  
  
       
 
 
   
     (17) 
(17) says that a modified net price, which is much less than the net price in the reference case, 
should grow at half the discount rate. Gross price is growing at a rate that is less than half of the 
discount rate.  
If the model was extended to include more periods and/or if the blending mandate was revised 
such that the resource constraint was activated and the revised net marginal revenue grew at 
the rate of interest, extraction and emissions paths would be extended relative to the reference 
scenario for the same reasons expressed in the competitive market solution.  
This is confirmed by running the model with a blending mandate that is held constant following 
an increase to 10% in period 3. Resource extraction declines and prices increase over time, 
although at a much slower rate than the reference case, and the entire resource is extracted 
just as the price reaches the choke point. Given these results, we can conclude that the green 
paradox does not hold. 
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6.4 Climate implications  
6.4.1 Perfect competition 
The blending mandate extraction and emissions paths are below that of the reference scenario 
through 2100 and mitigate temperature increases, but no more than 0.06°C. On the other 
hand, the RFS emissions path starts above that of the reference scenario and decreases 
dramatically following 2050. This leads to slightly higher temperature increases relative to the 
reference scenario until 2080; however, the temperature variance peaks at 0.008°C. Therefore, 
we can say that the strict green paradox holds, but its effect is minimal and short-lived. By 
2100, both the RFS and blending mandate policies are expected to result in only slightly 
mitigated temperature increases relative to the reference scenario. After 2100, since the entire 
stock of the resource is exhausted in all scenarios, the temperature increases begin to 
converge. 
Figure 6.10: Competitive transport carbon emissions and GHG concentrations for reference 
and policy scenarios 
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Table 6.3: Temperature (°C) impacts of biofuel policies in competitive market 
 
Reference RFS Blending mandate 
2030 1.21 1.22 1.21 
2050 1.99 1.99 1.97 
2075 2.87 2.87 2.83 
2100 3.45 3.42 3.40 
2150 3.99 3.95 3.95 
2200 4.05 4.05 4.06 
2250 4.02 4.02 4.02 
 
6.4.2 Monopoly 
Despite emissions paths in both policy scenarios below that of the reference scenario, the 
accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere is expected to be roughly in-line with the case of no 
policy intervention through 2100, resulting in temperature increase mitigation of a mere 
0.04°C. Because the resource stock in the policy scenarios is not fully exhausted, cumulative 
emissions through 2250 are less than those in the reference scenario by 104.0 Gt C and 51.4 Gt 
C for the RFS and blending mandate cases, respectively. This leads to continued temperature 
increase mitigation beyond 2100, peaking at 0.12°C and 0.08°C for the RFS and blending 
mandate cases, respectively. 
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Figure 6.11: Monopoly transport carbon emissions and GHG concentrations for reference and 
policy scenarios 
 
 
Table 6.4: Temperature (°C) impacts of biofuel policies in monopoly market 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper attempts to identify whether or not the green paradox is withheld when RFS or 
blending mandate biofuel policies are implemented to promote the use of the renewable fuel 
in the transport sector. The problem is addressed using a simplified model of the global 
transport market for energy, provided solely by fossil-based fuels made from oil and biofuels. 
Specifically, the effects of the RFS and blending mandate policies, implemented on a global 
scale, on oil resource owners’ extraction paths are analyzed. A climate change model translates 
emissions from the use of the fossil-based fuels to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere and temperature implications. 
The results of the models suggest that the weak green paradox only holds for the case when an 
RFS biofuel policy is employed and the non-renewable oil is supplied by a competitive market. 
The strict paradox also holds; however, it is short-lived and the impacts are minimal, with 
temperatures increasing by no more than 0.008°C relative to the reference case. The 
implementation of the RFS policy is the same as lowering the choke price faced by the resource 
owners. Because the optimal net price path continues to follow the rate of interest, they must 
lower initial prices and speed up extraction if the entire stock is to be exhausted.  
It is clear that the green paradox does not hold in either the competitive or monopoly markets 
when a blending mandate policy is introduced. Resource extraction is delayed in both markets 
so we may also suspect to see delayed extraction of the resource when supplied by a cartel-
fringe market. This is a result of the oil resource owners’ efforts to avoid increasing the 
introduction of biofuels in the market which is tied to their level of production. The incentive to 
sell more in the present while the blending mandate is lowest is outweighed by the cost, in 
terms of a lower price, of increasing the supply of the resource in the market. While extraction 
paths are delayed in these scenarios, the reduced emissions in the earlier periods have a very 
small effect on estimated increases in the global temperature.  
The outcomes imply that a blending mandate policy is a more effective tool for promoting the 
use of biofuels in the transport sector if intentions are to reduce near-term carbon emissions; 
however, we can’t rely on the use of the renewable fuel to play a significant role in mitigating 
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climate change. Unfortunately, these results rely heavily on the specification of the reference 
model, the design of the biofuel policies and the climate change model. Therefore, outcomes 
should be taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, the resource owners’ reactions to the biofuel 
policies follow intuitively and the direction of the temperature changes coincide with what we 
would expect to see given the revised emission paths. 
While some estimates conclude that there is sufficient land available for the production of the 
levels of biomass feedstock necessary to produce enough biofuels to fulfill a large portion of 
transport energy demand, it’s hard not to be skeptical given the rising population levels and 
food requirements. Furthermore, if 2nd generation biofuel cost reductions are not achieved and 
we must continue to rely on 1st generation biofuels to fulfill targeted levels of biofuel use, GHG 
emission reductions will be limited and mitigation of temperature increases will be even more 
negligible. In reality, these policies are only used by the U.S. and EU, so we can expect the use 
of biofuels to have an even smaller impact on future temperature increases than presented in 
this paper. These observations suggest that it may be better to focus attention on other 
strategies to mitigate anthropogenic climate change and/or towards creating adaptation plans 
for dealing with the consequences of what seems to be increasingly inevitable global warming.   
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Appendix 
A. Reference model sensitivity to assumptions  
Elasticity 
Altering the assumption about the elasticity influences the parameters of the demand function 
and ultimately the choke price. Increasing the assumed price elasticity, lowers the highest price 
the resource owner can charge forcing the owner to lower the earlier prices charged in order to 
sell the allotted stock before reaching the choke price and also leads to a shorter extraction 
period.  
Figure A.1: Resource extraction paths for different elasticities 
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Figure A.2: Gross price paths for different elasticities 
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that the Hotelling scarcity rent would be equal to zero; however, the resource would still have a 
positive user cost (the difference between the price and marginal cost of extraction). 
Figure A.3: Resource extraction paths for different levels of constant marginal extraction 
costs 
 
 
Figure A.4: Gross price paths for different levels of constant marginal extraction costs 
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available to the sector. A change in this percentage will influence demand and stock in ways 
that will offset each other. For instance, increasing the percentage will increase the demand for 
oil by the sector in every period, but will be offset by an increase in the available stock to be 
used by the sector. 
Table A.1: Summary of resource extraction and price path sensitivity to model assumptions 
Assumption ( ) 
      
  
 
  
  
 
Elasticity - - 
     + + 
     - + 
Extraction costs + + 
 
 
